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PRIVATIZATION OF THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
SYSTEM - ITS RATIONALE,
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPLICATIONS
DAVID DUNCAN
I. VIEWS ON PRIVATIZATION
A. Introduction
M ANY BELIEVE THE time is right to privatize the na-
tion' s air traffic control system.' Proposed privatiza-
tion plans would allow the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to continue regulating standards in
safety, public service, and efficiency, but would contract-
out certain portions of delivery and maintenance. 2 Propo-
nents believe privatization will increase efficiency and
safety and decrease cost.3 Privatization is timely,they say,
for three reasons.4 First, the FAA has failed to perform its
function adequately. 5 Second, there are several thousand
air traffic controllers in the labor pool who are not eligible
to work as federal air traffic controllers but who could be
Privatization Commission Recommends Reduced Federal Role in Air Traffic
System, President's Commission on Privatization (Dec. 21, 1987) [hereinafter
Privatization Commission Recommends Reduced Federal Role]; Miller, A Reagan
Legacy? "Privatization " Push Renewed on Two Fronts, INDUSTRY WEEK, Nov. 16, 1987,
at 19-20; Poole, User-Friendly Air Traffic Control, Now, Wall St. J.,July 1, 1987, at 22,
col. 3.
2 Privatization Commission Recommends Reduced Federal Role, supra note 1,
at 1.
Id.
4 E. Lynch & D. Hagerty, Privatization of the Federal Aviation Administration's
Services, Issues and Options (Dec. 17, 1987) (unpublished study prepared for the
President's Commission on Privatization).
5 See infra notes 87 to 103 and accompanying text.
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employed by private companies.6 Finally, the installation
of a whole new generation of air traffic control equipment
presents an opportunity to phase out current federal
maintenance personnel and to phase in contracting
maintenance.7
B. Recent Privatization Attempts
The Reagan Administration sought to reduce the size of
the federal government, to reduce the role of the federal
government in the nation's economy, and to place into
private hands those activities that are inappropriate to the
government.8 Underlying the attempt to decrease the role
of government was the belief that the government itself,
by its great size, posed a threat to democracy. 9 A basic
premise of Reagan's ideology was that the government
can regulate the production of goods and services without
providing them.' 0 Another basic premise was that gov-
ernment should not do anything private enterprise can do
better." As one way to achieve these goals the Reagan
6 E. Lynch & D. Hagerty, supra note 4, at 28-29. Private air traffic controllers
come from the ranks of the 11,500 federally employed controllers fired by Presi-
dent Reagan, as well as from the ranks of retired military controllers. President
Reagan refused to rehire the fired controllers. Retired military personnel are gen-
erally past the federal age requirement of thirty one. A private company which
refused to hire them on the basis of age would be subject to liability for age dis-
crimination. Id. at 26, 28-29.
7 Id. at 15-20. In 1982, the FAA proposed the National Airspace System Plan.
The plan includes installing a new computer system at all twenty en route centers
(en route centers direct traffic between airports), airport surveillance radar at
many major airports, a voice switching and communication system enabling com-
puter responses to voice messages, and other new technology. The new genera-
tion of equipment will be nearly all solid state, with improved reliability, easier
repair procedures, and greater remote maintenance monitoring. The FAA antici-
pates that the new equipment will allow the FAA to reduce its need for techni-
cians, increase its reliance on contractors, require that equipment manufacturers
train the technicians, take advantage of the efficiencies of specialization, and save
substantial funds. Id.
Smith, Reagan's Budget: Selling Offthe Government, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1986, at 70.
The move away from central governmental control and operation reflected a
global movement toward privatization. Id.; see also Bleiberg, From Public to Private
Hands; Both at Home and Abroad, the Big Switch is On, BARRONS, Jan. 20, 1986, at 9.
E. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 7-25 (1982).
S. BUTLER, PRIVATIZING FEDERAL SPENDING 50-52 (1985).
Privatization Commission Recommends Reduced Federal Role, supra note 1,
COMMENTS
Administration encouraged privatization of federal gov-
ernmental activities. As an additional benefit, privatiza-
tion would decrease or eliminate the federal expense of
providing the privatized activities and would increase fed-
eral revenues through the sale of certain government en-
terprises and assets.' 2
The Reagan Administration proposed the sale of five
federally owned Power Administrations in the South and
West.' 3 The proposal included the sale of the Grand Cou-
lee and Bonneville dams owned by the Bonneville Power
Administration, which supplies half of the electric power
to the Pacific Northwest.' 4 The other Power Administra-
tions proposed for sale were the Alaska, Southeastern,
Southwestern, and Western Area.15
Reagan's privatization plans also included the sale of
federally owned Washington National and Dulles Interna-
tional Airports.' 6 In addition, the administration wanted
to sell the national petroleum reserve, the nation's thir-
teen thousand four hundred miles of railroad freight
lines, and the nation's unprofitable passenger railway sys-
tem, Amtrak.' 7  Finally, the administration studied the
sale of government loan portfolios, postal services, pris-
ons, and military commissaries.' 8
President Reagan attempted to implement privatization.
through a series of task forces. In 1981 the President
at 1; see also Pack, Privatization of Public-Sector Services in Theory and Practice, 6J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 523 (1987).
12 Smith, supra note 8, at 70. The Reagan administration gained inspiration
from and pointed approvingly to the United Kingdom's Thatcher government.
The Thatcher government successfully raised eleven billion three hundred mil-
lion dollars by selling government owned properties, including Jaguar, British
Aerospace, and part of British Telecommunications. In spite of the Thatcher gov-
ernment's success, Smith states that the privatization measures will have little long
term effect on the budget deficit. Id.; see also S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 33-43.
1., Smith, supra note 8, at 71.
14 Id.
1 Id. at 71-72.
- Id.
37 Id. at 72-74. On the other side of the world,Japan also has planned to sell its
national railway system as well as its national telecommunications company. Id.
"I Miller, supra note 1, at 20.
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formed the Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives. 19 In
1982 the President set up the Federal Property Review
Board, as a part of the Executive Office of the President,
to facilitate the privatization of the federal government's
real assets.20 In 1983 Reagan dismantled the Task Force
and set up the President's Advisory Council on Private
Sector Initiatives in its place.2' In 1985, he replaced the
Advisory Council with the Presidential Board of Advisers
on Private Sector Initiatives, which reported to the White
House Office of Private Sector Initiatives.2 Finally, in
1987, the administration set up the Commission on Priva-
tization as well as the Office of Privatization, however,
within the Office of Management and Budget.23 The only
tangible results were congressional approval of the sale of
19 The Making of a Privatization Boondoggle, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1987, at 57
[hereinafter Privatization Boondoggle].
20 Exec. Order No. 12,348, 47 Fed. Reg. 8547 (1982). The Review Board func-
tioned to "develop and review Federal real property acquisition, utilization, and
disposal policies .... " Id. The Executive Order also directed all executive agen-
cies to periodically review all of their real property holdings. The object was to
identify properties that were not used or were under used. The Review Board
then had the responsibility to recommend the disposal of surplus properties. Id.
21 Exec. Order No. 12,427, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,083 (1983). The Advisory Council
reported to the White House Office of Private Sector Initiatives. Its function was
to monitor the President's private sector initiative policies. The Council focused
on increasing public awareness of the importance of privatization, removing barri-
ers to private sector delivery of social service programs, and strengthening the
professional resources of the private social service sector. Id.
22 Exec. Order No. 12,528, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,389 (1985). The Board has the
same functions as the Advisory Council plus an additional mission to study "op-
tions for promoting the long-term development of private sector initiatives ... 
Id.
23 Exec. Order No. 12,607, 52 Fed Reg. 34,190 (1987). The President's Com-
mission on Privatization had more specific functions.
(a) The Commission shall study and evaluate:
(1) Past and current privatization efforts by the Federal govern-
ment, State and local governments, and foreign govern-
ments, including asset sales by the Federal government;
(2) Literature and writing on privatization; and
(3) The environment for additional privatization efforts by the
Federal government.
(b) The Commission shall review the current activities of the Fed-
eral government, including asset holdings, and identify those
functions that:
(1) Are not properly the responsibility of the Federal govern-
ment and should be divested or transferred to the private
1989] COMMENTS 799
Conrail and of college and rural housing loan portfolios. 4
C. Struggles With Privatization: Individual Taxpayers vs.
Organized Constituencies
Most political figures do not openly oppose the basic
principle and theory of privatization. 5 Privatization has
not been successful for two reasons. First, highly moti-
vated and well organized constituencies strongly oppose
specific privatization proposals.2 6 Second, the individual
sector, with no residual involvement by the Federal govern-
ment; or
(2) Require continuing oversight by an Executive Branch
agency but can be performed more efficiently by a private
entity, including the use of vouchers as an alternative to di-
rect service.
(c) The Commission shall develop the framework for a privatization
program, identifying:
(1) Privatization opportunities, including those identified in (b)
above, listed in order of priority;
(2) Legislative and administrative actions necessary to effect the
privatization initiatives or remove existing privatization
restrictions;
(3) Needed improvements to personnel and administrative pol-
icy to create an environment conducive to privatization;
(4) Organizational and resource requirements necessary to im-
plement successfully the privatization program; and
(5) Actions necessary to create broad-based support for priva-
tization efforts.
Id.
I.4 Miller, supra note 1, at 19.
25 Smith, supra note 8, at 70. "[T]he basic assumption - that government
should not do what the private sector can do - is close enough to bedrock Ameri-
can thinking that so far the Democrats have not assailed it." Id. Republicans are
more prone to favor privatization than Democrats, however, and the most active
intellectual promoter of privatization is the conservative Heritage Foundation. Id.
The Heritage Foundation describes itself as "dedicated to the principles of free
competitive enterpise, limited government, individual liberty, and a strong na-
tional defense." THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 1988 HERITAGE PUBLICATIONS (in-
side the front cover).
2 ( S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 14-18. These constituencies can be divided into
four groups. First, beneficiaries and near-beneficiaries, which includes those who
actually benefit from a particular program (i.e. Social Security recipients), and
those who do not yet benefit but who believe they should be included (a person
denied welfare because he has a tiny bit too much income). Second, administra-
tors, or those who run the programs. Third, service providers, which includes, for
instance, construction contractors, construction workers, defense contractors,
human-service professionals (social workers, nurses, physical and psychological
800 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
taxpayers do not as individuals feel oppressed by the cost
of individual federal programs. 27 The cost of any one par-
ticular government program is spread too thin to gener-
ate the kind of concern in individual taxpayers that will
sustain the offensive necessary to privatize that particular
program. The individual taxpayer is likely to be con-
cerned only with the general over-all level of government
spending.2 8
When a program faces a threat, however, organizations
and coalitions are often already in place to defend it.29
Over the life of the program its proponents gradually ac-
cumulate a wider constituency and power, in what has
been described as the "ratchet" effect.3 0  The people a
program favors become aware of and depend on its exist-
ence. They have, relative to those who do not benefit, a
lot at stake. Consequently, supporters of individual pro-
grams are strongly motivated to resist changes in those
programs.' Often, those supporters mobilize research
and propaganda. 2
Program supporters, often the bureaucrats running the
therapists), teachers' unions, postal employee unions and other government em-
ployee unions. Finally, political activists, such as elected politicians who enter
politics to expand the role of the government and research and policy institutes




211 Id. at 2. The National Association of Letter Carriers repeatedly warns its
members of "the clear and present danger" of privatization of the United States
Postal Service. The Association's Political Action Committee made a total of $1.2
million in contributions to federal candidates in 1984. Postal unions represent
over 750,000 members, covering every congressional district. THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, PRIVATIZATION: A STRATEGY FOR TAMING THE FEDERAL BUDGET Fis-
CAL YEAR 1988 32-33 (1987) [hereinafter TAMING THE FEDERAL BUDGET]; see also
J.Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 333 (1973) (discussing past efforts to re-
duce the budgets for education and welfare).
.1 S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 24-25; see also M. DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR
SOCIAL SECURITY 24 (1979).
.- S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 26.
-12 Id. at 25-29. As an example, several groups, including the National Air Traf-
fic Controllers' Association, the AFL-CIO, the Airport Operators Council Interna-
tional, the Aircraft Owners' and Pilots' Association, the National Association of
Air Traffic Specialists, and the American Association of Airport Executives,
presented testimony at the recent hearings held by the President's Commission
COMMENTS
program, direct the attention of the media to those cases
of extreme hardship which a proposed change in the pro-
gram would effect.3 The media sometimes focuses on
these extreme cases, creating an unfavorable public image
of the proposed change. 4
An organized resistance to privatization also means that
an elected representative who feels that a program is ripe
for privatization will, on the one hand, confront a well or-
ganized and motivated force working to discredit him and
his ideas.3 5 On the other hand, that same elected repre-
sentative will find that, because the costs are spread thin
on any given issue, the supporters of privatization lack
motivation. 6  Thus, a politician's decision to support
privatization can alienate an organized and motivated
constituency while, at the same time, attract few
supporters .
Public employee unions also offer strong resistance to
privatization. 8 The unions are motivated by concerns
on Privatization. Each presented testimony against privatization, reflecting its
own research. E. Lynch & D. Hagerty, supra note 4, passim.
:,:, S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 29. Reagan budget cutting efforts were attacked
by front-page stories of hardship cases. These included a story about a veteran cut
from disability assistance and one about the suspension of a senior citizen's wel-
fare check. Id.
:s, Id. Sometimes the hardship is an unintended effect of a change which can be
corrected. Id.
w, Id. at 28. In 1981, the Reagan administration proposed replacing some fed-
eral social welfare and urban assistance programs. The Urban Institute came for-
ward with two studies claiming that private charities could not fill "the gap". The
Institute also maintained that federal tax disincentives and service-contract cut-
backs would take $45 billion in resources away from the nonprofit sector over four
years. Id.; see also L. SALAMON & A. ABRAMSON, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND
NONPROFIT SECTOR: IMPLICATIONS OF THE REAGAN BUDGET PROPOSALS (1981); C.
CLOTFELTER & L. SALAMON, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE NONPROFIT SEC-
TOR: THE IMPACT OF THE 1981 TAx ACT ON INDIVIDUAL CHARITABLE GIVING
(1981)(the two Urban Institute studies mentioned).
m" S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 28.
:,7 Id. An example of this phenomenon is the political damage suffered by Presi-
dent Reagan and David Stockman during and following their unsuccessful efforts
from 1981 to 1984 to reduce federal spending. Unfavorable publicity eventually
led to the resignation of Stockman. Id. at 27.
1" Miller, supra note 1, at 19. One example is the National Education Associa-
tion, which has resisted alternatives to public education, such as tuition tax credits
and vouchers. S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 108. Another example is the effort of
19891
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over loss ofjobs, benefits, and pay levels. In the past, un-
ions have endorsed candidates, contributed to campaigns,
and provided favored candidates with campaign work-
ers.3 9 In return, federal employee unions have expected
more money for their programs, higher wages, more
favorable collective bargaining rules, more jobs, and gen-
erally an entrenchment for their constituencies. 40 Some
feel there is little difference between this and bribery.4 '
Proponents of privatization argue that federal bureau-
crats also have resisted privatization.42  They claim that
federal bureaucrats tend to believe that the public is best
served by an active government.4 3 Proponents of priva-
tization claim bureaucrats believe that the larger the
agency, the greater is that agency's power to accomplish
its goals." As the number of people benefitted by an
agency program increases, so does the base of support for
that program. 5 In addition, proponents of privatization
argue, as a particular agency becomes larger, the opportu-
nities for employee advancement also increase. 46 Priva-
tization proponents maintain that bureaucrats award
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees to entrench
itself against what it perceives to be an onslaught of private hospitals in New York.
Dionne, Unions Awaiting Carey's Quid Pro Quo, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1978, at B6, col.
3.
.' E. SAVAS, supra note 9, at 84.
41 Id.; see also Dionne, supra note 38, at B6, col. 1-4. After New York Governor
Carey's 1978 election, public-employee union supporters expected to preserve
and expand their influence. They expected extension of the state law mandating
"agency shops", which requires the assessment of the equivalent of union dues
from non-union public employees, in the state government. Id. at B6, col. 1-2.
The unions also wanted a law allowing local governments to reach agency shop
agreements. Id. In that election, the United Federation of Teachers won a pledge
from Carey for increased state support of education. Id. at B6, col. 3-4.
4, E. SAVAS, supra note 9, at 84.
412 S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 28-29.
4. Id. at 22.
4 E. SAVAS, supra note 9, at 20. Robert J. Myers, former chief actuary for the
Social Security Administration, once stated that, "[o]ver the years, most of
the.. .staff engaged in program planning and policy development have had the
philosophy - carried out with almost a religious zeal - that what counts above
all is the expansion of the program." M. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 24.
4" S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 21-23.
4,; E. SAVAS, supra note 9, at 19-20.
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contracts and research grants to those favoring their pro-
grams.47 They also claim that bureaucrats select research
topics which produce data favoriable to expansion of their
own programs.4" Some of these research projects help
identify the beneficiaries of the programs, enabling the
agency to identify and target its support.49 In addition,
agencies time the release of research information to sup-
port agency positions.50
Privatization has appeal in the abstract but little support
in reality. Privatization requires that individual federal
programs shrink, disappear, or otherwise change. The
people who already benefit by those programs react
strongly against such changes. The people who would
benefit from the privatization of those programs do not
benefit directly enough or strongly enough to feel con-
cern. In the next section, the author will discuss strate-
gies suggested by the reality of the situation. The
strategies suggested center on structuring individual
privatization proposals to strongly and directly benefit
specific targeted groups. The goal is to create a constitu-
ency or many constituencies for privatization.
II. STRATEGIES OF PROPONENTS OF PRIVATIZATION
In spite of the lack of even one major victory, propo-
nents of privatization are apparently not dismayed. 5' Tak-
ing a cue from some of their opponents, they have settled
in for what has been described as political guerilla war-
fare. 52 Content to gain ground a little at a time, propo-
nents of privatization intend to concentrate first and
47 S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 20.
4, Id. at 20-21.
Id.
Id. In 1982, when Reagan appointees brought in outside evaluators to study
a discretionary grant program of the Department of Health and Human Services,
the professional staff denounced the Administration's efforts to the news media.
Their complaint was that the new evaluators, who favored Administration objec-
tives, had no experience working with the federal government. Id. at 28-29.
5, See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of results
to date.
-- S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 58.
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primarily on convincing the public of the wisdom of their
cause.
53
Proponents of privatization want to create a pro-priva-
tization climate and constituency.5 4 They would achieve
this by effecting a series of small successes, exploiting
those successes through propaganda machinery, and
slowly building a number of separate coalitions, each
favorable to a particular privatization program. The sum
of all these coalitions would, they believe, achieve a pro-
privatization climate.
Proponents of privatization encourage the neutraliza-
tion of opposition.5 5 They want to sell appropriate pro-
grams to the workers of the programs and to those who
benefit from the programs. 6 Where possible, proponents
of privatization want to encourage ownership of priva-
tized functions by a wide base of people outside the group
of people who perform those functions.5 7 Proponents of
privatization want the administration to contract out func-
tions that the administration cannot sell.58 Proponents of
privatization argue that encouraging wide-based owner-
ship and privatized delivery of government services will
create a "private-sector ratchet".5 9 Beneficiaries and near-
beneficiaries will push for more privatization and strongly
resist efforts to encroach on previously privatized
Id.
Id. at 58-62; see also Savas, The Efficiency of the Private Sector, in THE PRIVATIZA-
TION OPTION 27-28 (S. Butler ed. 1985).
• S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 46.
i Id. at 59-60.
.7 When the British government privatized British Telecom, it encouraged as
much ownership by ordinary citizens as possible. The aim of the British govern-
ment was to make sure that re-nationalization would be impossible. Before the
sale of British Telecom, the Post Office operated the telephone monopoly. Id. at
39, 42-43.
r" Id. at 53-56. For example, en route air traffic control center computer main-
tenance and weather briefings for air traffic controllers could be contracted out.
En route centers direct aircraft between airports and in oceanic airspace adjacent
to the continental United States. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION,
PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 77-78 (1988) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
m, Butler, Changing the Political Dynamics of Government, in PROSPECTS FOR PRIVA-
TIZATION 8-13 (S. Hanke ed. 1987).
functions .60
If proponents of privatization cannot accomplish any of
the above, they would promote the distribution of vouch-
ers where practical. 6' The government will still control
the program, but the holders of the vouchers will obtain
needed products and services from private providers.62
Voucher programs subsidize individual demand for pri-
vately produced products and services.6 3 Both providers
and those who receive the vouchers would, presumably,
support the privatized program.64 Voucher programs
would encourage the public to view the government as a
facilitator and not a provider.
As another strategy, privatization theorists want to shift
the cost of each government program, as directly as possi-
ble, to those who actually use the products or services of
that program. 65 Theoretically, this should eventually en-
sure efficient allocation of resources.66 The users of those
government products and services will force each govern-
ment program to either work efficiently or perish. 67 In ad-
dition, if goods and services currently provided by the
government can be provided more cheaply or more effi-
ciently by the private sector, direct user charges will shift
Id. at 9. Proponents of privatization also want to deregulate statutory mo-
nopolies and to eliminate restrictive licensing rules. See S. BUTLER, supra note 10
at 36, 60. Proponents believe this would stimulate the creation of private firms
and would encourage the government to operate more efficiently. Id. at 36.
- Id. at 56-57. Under a voucher system the government issues a subsidy to
individual taxpayers in the form of a claim upon the government in dollars, to be
redeemed by the provider of goods or services whom the taxpayer chooses to
patronize. Examples of voucher systems include food stamps, rent vouchers, the
GI Bill of Rights tuition subsidies, Medicaid, and Medicare. The holder of the
voucher chooses his own provider. E. SAVAS, supra note 9, at 67-69.
w Id. at 68.
6 Id.
See S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 56-57.
65 Id. at 59, 135; see also E. SAVAS, supra note 9, at 83, 131-33.
.W Hanke, The Theory of Privatization, in THE PRIVATIZATION OPrIoN 5-6 (S. Butler
ed. 1985).
67 E. SAVAS, supra note 9, at 131-33. "If hidden subsidies for government-pro-
duced services are prohibited, and the full cost of the service is charged to the
user, citizens will start looking for alternatives if they feel the service isn't worth
the price." Id. at 132.
1989] COMMENTS 805
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demand for publicly provided goods and services to pri-
vate suppliers. 68 Therefore, direct user charges should be
implemented to the greatest extent possible.
Proponents of privatization no longer see "supply side"
economics as the way to effect broad across-the-board
budget cuts or a reduction in size of the federal govern-
ment. 69 They argue that the staggering increase in federal
expenditures during the Reagan Administration proves
that reducing revenues does not reduce spending. 70 Pro-
ponents of privatization have shifted strategy to accom-
modate a long-term view of their struggle. 7' They now
emphasize the need to educate the public to view the gov-
ernment as a facilitator or administrator, and not as a pro-
vider.72 Proponents are now working to form a series of
privatized programs, each with its own pro-privatization
constituency. 73 Proponents of privatization see the na-
tion's air traffic control system as just one target upon
which to foCUS. 74
III. THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM
A. Arguments Against A TC Privatization
Often air travelers assume that the air traffic control
system is, by its nature, operable only by the federal gov-
ernment.75 Many fear private enterprise will compromise
safety in order to control coStS, 7 6 and others claim that the
- Id. For example, in St. Paul, Minnesota the city lost virtually all of its custom-
ers to a private firm who charged 26% less than the city for residential refuse
collection. Id.
611 S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 5-6. During the Reagan Administration, federal
spending reached an all-time high, unsurpassed even in war time. Id. at 6.
7,, Id. at 5-6.
7I Id. at 25 (advocating a gradualist approach and seeking to win a number of
small political victories, each of which extends and strengthens the coalition).
T! id. at 57-62.
74 Id.
14 Miller, supra note 1, at 20. The President's Commission on Privatization has
given top priority to in-depth studies of housing, loan portfolios, educational
vouchers, air traffic control, and to the contracting-out of postal services, prisons,
and military commissaries. Id.
7. S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 134.
76 Id. at 133.
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system is a natural monopoly that can be run only by gov-
ernment. 77 Most agree safety requires that all aircraft use
one air traffic control system with the FAA maintaining
responsibility for oversight and regulation.78
A second concern of critics of air traffic control priva-
tization is the possibility of a strike by air traffic control-
lers.79 While federal controllers are prohibited from
striking, private controllers, as employees of private com-
panies, are not.80 Proponents of private air traffic control
acknowledge that all controllers should have the freedom
to form and join unions.8 l
A third major concern is national security. 82 The De-
partment of Defense opposes privatization because it
fears the loss of the high degree of coordination that cur-
rently exists between it and the FAA.83 It has also been
suggested that the Department of Defense opposes priva-
tization of air traffic control because it does not want to
pay for airway use.84
B. Proponents of Privatization: Deficiencies in Present System
Proponents of privatization of the air traffic control sys-
tem concede the need for central procedural and regula-
tory control.85  Proponents argue, however, that
privatization enhances safety, efficiency, and cost effec-
7 Id. at 133-34.
78 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 73.
7' TAMING THE FEDERAL BUDGET, supra note 29, at 56.
81 Id.
"' R. POOLE, PRIVATIZING THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM 18 (1986). Poole
suggests that contracting out to a number of firms at staggered intervals. Id.
This, he claims, would lessen the possibility of a devastating nationwide strike. Id.
' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 77.
Id. at 71-72, 77.
R. Poole, supra note 81, at 57. Poole argues that privatized ATC would im-
prove efficiency and therefore would enhance national defense. Id. Fred Smith of
the Competitive Enterprise Institute testified before the President's Commission
on Privatization that changing to a private system "need not change any of [the]
cooperative procedures" that have developed between the Department of De-
fense and the FAA. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 77.
- Privatization Commission Recommends Reduced Federal Role, supra note 1,
at 1.
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tiveness. 6 They contend that problems in the nation's air
traffic control system are systemic, a result of being organ-
ized and operated as a government bureaucracy.87 They
claim that so far the bureaucracy has harmed overall
safety to the extent that it has resisted new technology.
The Bureau of Air Commerce, predecessor to the FAA,
resisted airborne VHF radio, omnidirectional navigation
beacons (VOR), and blind-landing systems (ILS), all of
which were developed by the private company ARINC.88
Another predecessor to the FAA, the Civil Aeronautics
Authority, resisted replacing radiotelegraph communica-
tion with voice radio for overseas flights (also developed
by ARINC) and the implementation of radar separation of
air traffic.8 9 The system is doomed to inefficiency, they
say, because it is operated as a monopoly, funded with
taxes, protected by the civil service system, and subjected
to political control and interference. 90
First, proponents of privatization argue, political con-
trol of the air traffic control system undermines long-
range planning and personnel morale. 9' Proponents
claim that "leadership and direction change with almost
every election."9 2 From 1961 to 1981 there were seven
administrators of the FAA plus a number of short-term
administrators, each serving an average of thirty-five
months.93 Further, politically oriented groups have inter-
fered with FAA planning. As an example, in the mid-70s a
coalition of small aircraft users stopped the installation of
-, See S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 133-36; see also TAMING THE FEDERAL BUDGET,
supra note 29, at 57-58 ("The resources that can be devoted to safety necessarily
depend upon the total amount of resources available. Under the curent ATC sys-
tem resources are ineffectively and inefficiently used, thus reducing the amount of
resources available to ensure safety.")




Phillips, Time to Change Our Stalling Air Traffic Control System, Wall St. J.,July 5,
1984, at 36, col. 3.
s, Id.
iR. POOLE, Supra note 87, at 4.
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collision-avoidance systems in small aircraft.9 4
Second, rigid bureaucratic management has caused se-
rious morale problems within the ranks of government
employed air traffic controllers. 95  Current FAA proce-
dures require a two year operating history before staffing
changes are implemented at any given air traffic control
facility. 96 In addition, the present system does not allow
an airport operator to hire additional controllers when
needed, or to contract with an air carrier to establish a
hub.97 As proof of low morale in the present federal sys-
tem, proponents of privatization point to the fact that the
current federal air traffic controllers voted to form the Na-
tional Air Traffic Controllers Association in June of
1987.98
Proponents also insist that government support of the
air traffic control system through taxes diffuses the moti-
vation of individual users to demand efficiency. 99 The air
,,4 S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 133. In 1978, the FAA proposed a plan that
would have required the pilots of small aircraft to submit to radar guidance in
sixty-five terminal control areas. A coalition of 220,000 small aircraft users, repre-
sented by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, launched an immediate at-
tack which killed the proposal. Collision Rules Attacked, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1978,
at A13, col. 4.
m, S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 134. After the 1981 controller strike, Secretary
of Transportation Drew Lewis appointed an independent task force to study the
problem. The task force reported that the FAA's labor relations had been "very
poor" for the previous fifteen years. Among the problems cited were "autocratic"
and "impersonal" air traffic control managers, a civil service system that would
not allow management to fire substandard employees, superfluous layers of man-
agement, lack of cost-consciousness, and top managers insulated from front line
controller problems. R. POOLE, supra note 87, at 8. Since 1981 the ratio of con-
trollers to supervisory personnel has decreased from four to one to three to one.
Phillips, supra note 91, at 36, col. 3. Proponents of air traffic control privatization
claim that the FAA is currently demanding longer hours and mandatory overtime
from its controllers in a semi-military style. User-Friendly Air Traffic Control, supra
note 1, at 22, Col. 3.
m E. Lynch & D. Hagerty, supra note 4, at 27. FAA controllers are rated accord-
ing to the facility at which they work. This means that a controller might work at a
facility experiencing a high level of activity and yet that controller will not be eligi-
ble for advancement for two years. Id.
97 Id. at 27-28. Even if a carrier moves its hub operations to another airport,
the first airport will continue to be rated at the pre-move level for two years. Id.
Id. at 26.
Poole, supra note 1, at 22, col. 3. In addition, the FAA charges for landing
slots by aircraft weight and not by time of day. This means that users have no
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traffic control system is funded through the eight percent
airline ticket tax and the general-aviation fuel tax.' 00 Pro-
ponents of privatization claim these taxes have little effect
on demand.' 0' Even more alarming, because revenue
from the taxes flows into the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund, Congress, not the user, controls how the taxes are
spent. 10 2 As a result, proponents argue, the present sys-
tem suffers from lack of funds because of the Gramm-
Rudman atmosphere in Congress and the White
House.10 3
C. Arguments for Privatization
Proponents of privatization argue that privatization
would partially alleviate the current manpower shortage
in the federal system.'0 4 President Reagan helped to cre-
ate the shortage himself when he fired 11,500 members of
incentive to avoid peak-hour landing slots, doing nothing to alleviate peak-hour
congestion. R. POOLE, supra note 81, at 7. Supporters of privatization argue lack
of competition in the present system also negates incentive to achieve efficiency.
Proponents say that the current system operates on a "cost is no object" basis in a
misguided effort to achieve safety. S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 133-34.
Poole, supra note 1, at 22, col. 3.
Id. While fuel and ticket taxes are roughly proportionate to usage, they do
not reflect the true proportional cost of air traffic control services to small aircraft.
A small aircraft pays a small fraction of what a large commercial airline pays but
the small aircraft requires the same amount of controller time as the large aircraft.
R. Poole, supra note 87, at 12.
-,-, Poole, supra note 1, at 22, col. 3. The Trust Fund has an accumulated bal-
ance of approximately $5.6 billion. The Administration argues that as much as
eighty-five percent of the fund should support operations of the FAA. Congress
wants the money spent for equipment and facilities. The result is that the funds
are not being utilized. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 69.
., Poole, supra note 1, at 22, col. 3. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Bal-
anced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985) set a budget deficit
ceiling. The Act gave the Comptroller General, a functionary of the legislative
branch of the federal government, the power to force spending cuts if spending
exceeded that ceiling. It required across-the-board cuts in spending to reach
targeted spending levels. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. IV 1986). The Supreme
Court has held the provision giving the Comptroller General the responsibility to
tell the President where to cut spending is unconstitutional as a violation of the
separation-of-powers doctrine. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
.... Phillips, supra note 91, at 36, col. 3. The requirements for a private air traffic
control tower operator certificate are the same as for those who work for the FAA
with the exception that private controllers must have at least a second class medi-
cal certificate. 14 C.F.R. §§ 65.31-65.50 (1988).
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the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
(PATCO) in 1981.05 Arguably, the manpower shortage
existed even before the firing of the PATCO members. 0 6
After privatization, private companies could employ pri-
vate air traffic controllers.' 0 7
Supporters of privatization also argue that safety will be
enhanced because private companies will be liable for
their negligence. 108 Presumably, private air traffic control
companies, for instance, would be liable to the same ex-
tent as other private companies. Tort liability of private
air traffic controllers has several implications discussed
later in this article.10 9
Private air traffic control companies already operate
control towers at several airports in the United States."10
After President Reagan fired 11,500 (80%) of the nation's
government employed air traffic controllers in 1981, the
government was forced to close down sixty-six airports."'
Later, the FAA announced it would not reopen thirty
towers."
2
At least four communities have private air traffic con-
trollers. 13 Part of the motivation for hiring private con-
trollers is that insurance policies for corporate jets often
1'5 S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 134. On August 3, 1981, the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), representing the nation's federally
employed air traffic controllers, called a strike. PATCO called the strike because
the FAA had denied a $681 million increase in salaries and benefits. In negotia-
tions, the government had offered an 11.4% increase, twice what other govern-
ment employees had received. The strike violated federal law forbidding strikes by
government employees against public safety. Presidential Press Conference, 17
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 845-46 (Aug. 3, 1981).
.. Phillips, supra note 91, at 36, col. 3. Before the strike, union members had
complained of staff shortages and poor working conditions. Id.
117 E. Lynch & D. Hagerty, supra note 4.
'" S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 135.
See infra notes 153-158 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tort
liability of private air traffic controllers.
I- Schlender, Some Small Airports Hiring Firms To Provide Air-Traffic Controllers,
Wall St.J., Mar. 24, 1982, at 29, col. 4.
I' Id.
112 Id.
- Id. Farmington, New Mexico; Enid, Oklahoma; Owensboro, Kentucky; and
Hobbs, New Mexico all employ private firms. Id.
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require the aircraft to operate from a field where there is a
controller. 14 The fact that several near collisions and at
least one major accident have been blamed on tower clos-
ings provides additional motivation." 5 Airport managers
across the country have reported that many pilots fail to
follow regulation landing patterns at uncontrolled air-
ports, further emphasizing the need for air traffic control-
lers at those airports." 6
Proponents of privatization claim the Farmington, New
Mexico experience proves that local air traffic control
should be performed by private business." 7 First, priva-
tization of air traffic control in Farmington effected con-
siderable cost savings." 18 The city pays about one third of
what it cost the FAA to run the facility." 9 Second, a coali-
tion of supporters formed to lobby the FAA to contract-
out air control services at the small airports from which
the FAA withdrew federal services. 20  Proponents of
privatization hope that the efficient and safe operation of
the Farmington airport will leverage an expansion of the
114 Id.
1' Id. At Flagstaff, Arizona, a disabled airplane crash landed because there was
another aircraft on the runway. A control tower could have cleared the runway
and avoided the necessity of a crash landing. Id.
, - Id. The FAA believes that pilots have become overly dependent on air traffic
controllers but will eventually be able to manage air traffic control at small air-
ports for themselves. Id.; see also Operation at airports without control towers, 14
C.F.R. § 91.89 (1988)(stating that aircraft approaching an airport without a con-
trol tower shall make all turns to the left unless the airport displays approved
signals or markings directing otherwise).
117 S. BUTLER, supra notelO, at 134.
" Schlender, supra note 110 at 29, col. 4.
. Id. The federal government spent an average of $287,000 per year to run
the facility. The city pays $99,000 per year to Midwest Air Traffic Control Serv-
ices of Olathe, Kansas. Farmington received additional savings from the fact that
the FAA leased the tower and equipment to the city for $1 per year. Other private
companies offering air traffic control service include Air Traffic Control Services,
Inc., Owensboro, Kentucky, and Barton Air Traffic Control, Inc., Medina, Ohio.
Id.
Poole, The Politics of Privatization, in THE PRIVATIZATION OrION 43-44 (1985).
The lobbying was achieved largely through the public relations efforts of such
groups as the Heritage Foundation of Washington, D.C., the American Associa-
tion of Airport Executives and the Chambers of Commerce of small cities wanting
air traffic control services. Id.
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privatization idea. ' 2
D. Efforts to Privatize the Air Traffic Control System
1. System Originally Private
The air traffic control system in the United States was
originally private. 2 2 It was organized as Aeronautical Ra-
dio Inc. (ARINC), a not-for-profit firm owned jointly by
the airlines with each company sharing costs in propor-
tion to airport use.123 In 1935, ARINC set up the first air
traffic control tower at Newark, New Jersey.12 4 This same
firm today operates the world's largest private line inter-
city communications network, serving more than 135 air-
line users. 2 5  The firm provides all airline-to-aircraft
communications services as well as all air traffic control
communications for all international flights out of New
York, Miami, San Juan, San Francisco, and Honolulu. 26
In 1936, the Bureau of Air Commerce assumed responsi-
bility to establish a federal "uniform centralized system of
airway traffic control."' 127 Nationalization of the system
was intended to help the then budding airline industry
through the Depression. 28
2. 1983 Heritage Foundation Proposal
A proposal to re-privatize the air traffic control system
came in 1982 from Robert Poole, then working for the
121 See id. Several foreign countries have private air traffic control. Switzerland,
Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the Persian Gulf and in the Caribbean Basin
use private systems. Poole, supra note 1, at 22, col. 3. The system in Switzerland,
Radio Suisse, is a government-chartered not-for-profit firm funded entirely from
user charges. Id. Other private providers of air traffic control services include
International Aeradio Ltd. of Great Britain, and Bendix, Lockheed, and Pan
American World Services, Inc. in the United States. Id.
"' Poole, supra note 1, at 22, col. 3.
,'' R. POOLE, supra note 87, at 9.
"'4 Id. The second and third towers were in Chicago and Cleveland respec-




,'' R. POOLE, supra note 81, at 14.
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Heritage Foundation of Washington, D.C. 29 Poole esti-
mated that the FAA spent approximately one million dol-
lars to install a tower at a small airport, and approximately
$275,000 per year to operate and maintain it.' 30 He fur-
ther estimated that a private firm could generate the same
service at a cost of around $120,000 per year, inclusive of
amortization of capital investment.' 3'
Mr. Poole, now heading the Reason Foundation of
Santa Monica, California, argues for a two tiered sys-
tem. 32 At the top would be a federally chartered not-for-
profit corporation which would manage and supervise the
overall system.' 33 The corporation would also operate
the nation's twenty en route air traffic control centers. 34
It would charge market prices, uncontrolled by Con-
gress. 3 5 Poole suggests widely based ownership of this
entity, including airlines, private pilots, business aircraft
owners, air traffic controllers, and the federal govern-
ment. t36 The second tier would be private for-profit com-
panies which would contract with the federally chartered
129 R. POOLE, supra note 87, passim. Glen A. Gilbert, who was the first controller
for the Bureau of Air Commerce in 1936, made the first proposal to re-privatize
the air traffic control system in 1968. Id. at 10. The aviation consulting firm based
the proposal partly on the fact that Lear Siegler, Inc. successfully trained military
controllers for service in Viet Nam. Phillips, supra note 91, at 36, col. 3.
... R. POoLE, supra note 87, at 10. All figures in this paragraph are in 1979
dollars.
' Id. Because they are not bound by civil service or union rules, private con-
trollers can handle clerical tasks during light traffic periods. The private control-
ler company Poole consulted, Barton ATC, also kept costs down by installing less
expensive radios and by using modular, prefabricated building components. Id.
12 R. POOLE, supra note 81, at 13.
1- R. POOLE, supra note 87, at 14. The not-for-profit structure avoids the dan-
gers of monopoly pricing by removing the reward. A single entity structure maxi-
mizes safety by insuring a unified air traffic control system. The corporate
structure insures that managers will get strong feedback from the stockholders,
who will be users. The corporate form would also help to get away from congres-
sional control, civil service requirements, the presidential prohibition against re-
hiring former striking air traffic controllers, and the governmental prohibition
against strikes. Id. at 13-15. Poole would render the possibility of a disastrous
strike remote by staggering expiration dates of facilities-management contracts.
R. POOLE, supra note 81, at 18.
134 R. POOLE, supra note 87, at 14.
1- Id.
I.- Poole, supra note 1; at 22, col. 3.
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not-for-profit corporation to provide the actual serv-
ices. 137 Under this plan the FAA would remain responsi-
ble for certifying airlines and aircraft, licensing pilots and
mechanics, developing and enforcing safety regulations
for aircraft design and operation, and ensuring standard
procedures and terminology throughout the system.'
38
3. Commission on Privatization Recommendations
In March of 1988, the President's Commission on
Privatization made nine recommendations regarding the
nation's air traffic control system.' 39  First, the FAA
should continue to oversee system regulation and safety
but portions of the system should be considered for priva-
tization. 40 Second, direct user charges should pay an in-
creased portion of airport and airway expenditures.
4
'
Third, the federal government should encourage airports
to develop their own sources of funding.' 42 Fourth, fed-
eral regulations should allow airport operators to charge
peak hour take-off and landing fees. 143 Fifth, regulations
should enable airports to charge passenger facility fees in
,.7 R. POOLE, supra note 87, at 14.
' ' R. POOLE, supra note 81, at 13.
, ' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 72-82; see supra notes 8 to 22 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the origin and purpose of the President's
Commission on Privatization.
141, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 72. Even the strongest propo-
nents of privatization testified before the Committee in favor of retention of the
FAA as a "safety watchdog." Id. at 73.
141 Id. at 74. This would include charges for weather briefings, peak-hour pric-
ing, and passenger facility charges. The Committee favored fee-for-service ar-
rangements as the most efficient way to direct resources to points of greatest
demand. Id. Former FAA Administrator Donald Engen expressed concern that
some pilots might not seek weather information if they had to pay for it, thereby
creating a safety risk to themselves and others. Id. at 81.
142 Id. at 75. Airports could charge for peak-hour takeoff and landing, passen-
ger facility use, rents from airport tenants, and baggage and freight handling for
shippers. The Committee pointed to arguments that this would result in a more
efficient allocation of airport resources. An airport should be able to support it-
self where there is a true demand for its services. Id.
,4. Id. This would alleviate congestion and allocate the scarce resource of time
in the fairest way possible. Those who are willing to pay for peak-hour takeoff and
landing can have it, but must pay a premium for the privilege. Id.
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order to generate revenue and to fund airport needs. 4 4
Sixth, the FAA should contract out portions of the en
route center system while retaining control of that sys-
tem.1 45 Seventh, the FAA should gradually increase the
percentage of privatized airport control towers, starting
with the smaller airports.' 46 Eighth, the FAA should con-
tract out its flight service stations, but should not allow
them to charge fees from individual pilots for flight infor-
mation. 147 Last, the FAA should privatize its system main-
tenance service, taking advantage of the simultaneous
aging of the work force and the equipment. 48
As evidence that the present air traffic control system
144 Id. at 76. This recommendation is aimed at alleviating federal interference.
Under the current system, when the federal government gives an airport grant
funds, the airport must adhere to federal restrictions. If the airport were free of
the grant funds, it would be free of many federal restrictions. Id.
'4 Id. at 78. This recommendation recognizes that the system is a natural mo-
nopoly. No one favors allowing competing firms to offer air traffic control in the
same airspace. Id. at 77. There is general agreement that price competition within
the same airspace is impracticable. Id. at 72. The recommendation reflects the
view that the en route system is a tightly integrated national structure that has
developed through historical experience in response to system requirements.
Although the Committee cited an Office of Management and Budget study main-
taining that, "the function of controlling en route air traffic is not inherently gov-
ernmental," the Committee declined to recommend setting up a private, not-for-
profit corporation to operate the en route center system, citing testimony before it
relating to safety, national security, technical, legal, and financial concerns. The
Committee did recognize, however, that some functions, such as computer main-
tenance and weather briefings, could be contracted out. Id. at 77-78.
146 Id. at 79-80. The Committee expressed concern that privatization of airport
traffic control towers received little support from aviation professionals. Chief
among the critics were two former FAA Administrators who were worried about
the potential for diverse standards and operating procedures. Id.
147 Id. at 81. Flight service stations provide a variety of services to general avia-
tion including weather briefings, filing and recording of flight plans, Notices to
Airmen (regarding changes in FAA regulations and in airport facilities nation-
wide), and in-flight services. Over 95% of these services are provided by tele-
phone, and are thought to be highly amenable to automation and consolidation.
All parties agree that Congress has been highly involved in selecting service facil-
ity sites, reversing FAA decisions to close facilities, mandating equipment require-
ments, and determining staffing levels. Proponents of privatization foresee
operating the flight service station system on a fee-for-service basis, thereby im-
posing market place economies and demands on the system. Id. at 80.
148 Id. at 82. The Committee cited testimony that contract system maintenance
would take advantage of the efficiencies of greater specialization, save a substan-
tial amount of FAA funds by requiring contractors to develop new equipment,
and speed the training of systems maintenance technicians. Id.
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does not work properly, the Commission cited to the rec-
ord number of complaints received by the Department of
Transportation in 1987 from airline passengers and other
system users, aviation legislation introduced in Congress,
and the number of major commercial aviation accidents in
that year. 4 9 The Commission also referred to testimony
from the Aviation Safety Commission, created by Con-
gress in 1986, which indicated that problems with the air
traffic control system stem from problems with resource
management. 50  As evidence that the air traffic control
system is overburdened with governmental and political
control, the Commission pointed out that the FAA is re-
viewed by the Department of Transportation, the Office
of Management and Budget, the General Accounting Of-
fice, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the Con-
gress.15 1 Witnesses pointed out that merely making the
FAA independent of the Department of Transportation
would not remove it from government procurement regu-
lations, policies, and personnel procedures. 52
149 Id. at 65.
'" Id. For example, the Commission of Privatization reiterated charges that the
FAA has mismanaged resources, poorly distributed personnel, and used inade-
quate procurement strategies. Id. at 67.68.
1.' Id. at 67. Former FAA Administrator J. Lynn Helms testified that in 1987
congressional committees directed the installation of over thirty pieces of equip-
ment that were neither authorized by Congress nor requested by the FAA. Id. J.
Donald Reilly of the Airport Operators Council International testified that it is not
uncommon to have twenty simultaneous investigations of an FAA project, nor to
"have more people investigating a project than there are working on it produc-
tively." Id. Congressional committees cover authorization, appropriations, inves-
tigations, and oversight. The FAA is also reviewed by the Office of Personnel
Management and two Presidential commissions. E. Lynch & D. Hagerty, supra
note 4, at 3. Merely making the FAA independent of the Department of Trans-
portation, as it was from 1958 to 1967, would not remove it from budget review
by the Office of Management and Budget and by the several congressional com-
mittees. Id. at 3-4.
152 E. Lynch & D. Hagerty, supra note 4, at 2-3.
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IV. PRIVATIZATION: TORT LIABILITY IMPLICATIONS
A. Government Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)
Currently, liability for the negligence of federal air traf-
fic controllers falls under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA). 153 The FTCA allows individuals to sue the fed-
eral government for the negligence of government con-
trollers to the same extent as they could sue a private
person.' 54 Cases arising under the FTCA are tried ac-
cording to the law of the state where the wrong occurred,
although brought in federal court.' 55 FTCA cases must
be tried without a jury. 56 Punitive damages are not al-
lowed. 57 Finally, the federal government cannot be sued
for discretionary acts at a planning level.' 58
15:, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982).
(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title [28 USCS
§§ 2671 et seq.], the district courts, together with the United States
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, ac-
cruing on and afterJanuary 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
Id.; see also Annotation, Liability of United States for Negligence of Air Traffic Controller,
46 A.L.R. FED. 24 (1980).
,.4 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
155 Id.
,' 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982). "Any action against the United States under sec-
tion 1346 shall be tried by the court without a jury, except that any action against
the United States under section 1346(a)(l)[concerning internal-revenue laws]
shall, at the request of either party to such action, be tried by the court with a
jury." Id.
1.1 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this
title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be
liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
[Tihis title shall not apply to -
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
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B. Private Air Traffic Controller Liability Under State Law
There are no reported cases relating to the tort liability
of private air traffic controllers. This section considers
the tort consequences of private air traffic control. First,
because private controllers are not federal employees,
they presumably do not fall under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.' 59 This means that, in the absence of federal
legislation, actions for private controller's negligence
must arise in state court under the law of the state where
the wrong occurred. 160  It also means that a jury can try
the case. 16 1 State courts, furthermore, may award puni-
tive damages, which are not allowed under the FTCA. 162
Most importantly, the FTCA does not protect discretion-
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused.
Id.; see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite a ship carry-
ing United States owned fertilizer exploded. Id. at 22-23. The Court held that the
government was not liable for the discretionary act of implementing a fertilizer
export program, nor for the proper execution of regulations regarding packaging
and loading of the fertilizer. Id. at 37-42.
15' See supra notes 153 to 158 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
FTCA; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982).
"Employee of the government" includes officers or employees of
any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the
United States, members of the National Guard while engaged in
training or duty . . . . and persons acting on behalf of a federal
agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the ser-
vice of the United States, whether with or without compensation.
Id.; see also Annotation, Who is an "Employee of the Government "for Whose Conduct the
United States May be Held Liable Under the Federal Torts Claim Act - Federal Cases 14 L.
Ed. 2d 892 (1964). The primary factor is: "Who has control or the right of con-
trol over the person's work?" Id. at § 3.
-1. See supra note 153. The FTCA only applies to the acts or omissions of gov-
ernmental employees. By implication, the Act does not apply where a tortious act
or omission is performed by someone who is not a government employee. As-
suming no diversity, the action must necessarily be brought before a state court.
Id.
.... See supra note 156. Claims under the FTCA are tried without a jury. Id. In
some states there is no right to trial by jury in civil actions. Right to jury trial is
constitutionally inviolate only in those classes of cases in which the right existed
before adoption of the Constitution. 47 AM. JUR. 2DJury § 29 (1969).
1,12 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 737 (1988). As a general rule, punitive damages
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ary acts of private service providers from tort liability.' 63
This might mean that if a private company chooses to re-
quire its controllers to work overtime, and a controller
makes a mistake because he is tired, that company would
be liable to a charge of negligence.'" Under the current
system the federal government is not liable for such a de-
cision. ' 65 Likewise, a private firm might incur tort liability
for not installing brightscope radar 166 or for using insuffi-
ciently trained controllers. 167 For the above reasons, pri-
vate air traffic controller firms are theoretically subject to
a greater tort liability risk than is the federal government.
Liability insurance is sometimes the largest item of cost
in the manufacture of a new aircraft.' 68  By analogy it is
reasonable to assume that liability insurance would be a
major cost of private air traffic control. Under the theory
of privatization, efficiency demands that the users of the
system bear that cost as directly as possible. 169 Propo-
are recoverable in tort actions. Id. State legislatures may, however, restrict or
deny the allowance of punitive damages. Id.
I- See supra note 158. The FTCA applies only to "an employee of the Govern-
ment". Id.
,,;4 Cf McCusker v. Curtis Wright Flying Serv., Inc., 269 11. App. 502, 1 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 431 (1933). An airline might be negligent if it used a tired pilot. The
first airplane accident to be reported in Illinois involved a pilot who had been
instructed by his employer to, "[g]o thru as far as possible without stopping for
sleep." Id. at 510, 1 Av. Cas. at 433.
-- Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 42. Governmental decisions made at a planning level, as
opposed to an operational level, do not subject the government to liability. Id.
... Cf L. KREINDLER, 2 AvIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 35.01 (1977). "It is difficult
to conceive of anything more discretionary in character than the determination of
where the greatest need exists for advanced equipment." Id. The criteria for de-
termining the need for navigational aids is set forth in the FAA publication, "Air-
way Planning Standard No. 1". Id. But cf. S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, 1 AVIATION
TORT LAW § 8:19 (1978). (An airline may have a duty to use radar.) Id. By anal-
ogy, a private air traffic control company may have the same duty.
17 Cf American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 11 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17156 (5th Cir. 1969). A pilot who had previously failed to execute a
missed approach procedure to the satisfaction of an FAA examiner was allowed to
take over a 727 on approach at night in marginal weather. The court stated,
"There is ample support for allowing recovery for negligence in allowing insuffi-
ciently trained pilots to take over." Id. at 197, 11 Av. Cas. at 17168.
-, Remarks by the Honorable Donald D. Engen, Twelfth Annual FAA Forecast
Conference (Feb. 20, 1987).
-!, See supra notes 65 to 68 and accompanying text for a discussion of direct user
costs.
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nents of privatization maintain that the costs will be there
no matter how the system operates.1 70 The real question,
they say, is whether the costs should be borne by the tax-
payers as a whole or, through explicit, visible insurance
policies by those who use aviation. 17 1
V. CONCLUSION
Proponents of privatization want to privatize the air
traffic control system now. They believe that a combina-
tion of existing factors present a unique opportunity.' 72 A
large pool of private air traffic controllers exists simulta-
neously with the phasing out of a huge and complex
equipment system.' 7 1 In addition, privatization propo-
nents are displeased with the current system.174 If too
much time passes, the current pool of eligible private air
traffic controllers will dwindle and the FAA will have to
commit resources to training new equipment maintenance
personnel.
In response, the President's Commission on Privatiza-
tion has made several proposals. 75 These proposals
would create opportunity for private services. Con-
tracting-out maintenance of the en route service system
would create private sector jobs outright, as would in-
creasing the number of privatized airport control towers.
Additionally, there would be a change in who pays for the
air traffic control system. In general, those who directly
use the system would pay a higher percentage of the total
cost in relation to the demands they make on the sys-
,7o R. POOLE, supra note 81, at 25.
,7, Id. Of course, Congress could put a limit on private air controller liability,
similar to nuclear power plant liability in the Price-Anderson Act or to interna-
tional aircraft accident liability under the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 25-26.
172 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of factors favoring
privatization.
173 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
,74 See supra notes 85-103 and 149-152 and accompanying text for discussion of
displeasure with the current system.
17. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 72-82; see supra notes 139-148
and accompanying text for a discussion of the nine recommendations of the Presi-
dent's Commission on Privatization.
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tem. 176 The consumer could expect to see additional
charges for airport services, such as baggage handling.
Those people who use baggage handling services could
expect to pay extra for it. Those who have no luggage or
carry their own will not have to pay for the luggage of
others. In addition, private aircraft operators and owners
would pay a larger percentage of the cost. Under the
Commission's proposals, it might cost a small aircraft car-
rying one person the same to land at a large airport as it
would a 747 carrying three hundred passengers. If land-
ing fees were related to number of passengers, small pri-
vate and corporate aircraft might be confined by
economics to small airports. Furthermoe, the average
commercial passenger wanting to travel at peak hours
would pay a premium. 77 The implication is that fewer
flights would be scheduled at peak hours and more at off-
peak hours. Possibly cheaper fares in off hours would also
result. Finally, the proposals mean that some airports
would probably close. The proposals imply that airports
would be expected to fund themselves.' 7 8 Those airports
for which there is little demand would probably not be
able to survive.
The Commission acknowledges the need for centralized
regulation and control with regard to standards and
safety. Even under the Commission's proposals the FAA
would continue to oversee safety and licensing. 79 The
FAA would still be responsible for determining who can
be a pilot or an air traffic controller. It would continue to
set safety standards regarding all phases of the air traffic
control system. It would also continue to regulate and
17, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 74; see supra note 141 and accom-
panying text.
177 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 75; see supra note 143 and accom-
panying text.
178 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 75-76; see supra notes 142 and
144 and accompanying text.
171, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 58, at 72-73; see supra note 140 and ac-
companying text.
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control private maintenance companies as well as private
air traffic controllers.
The fact that private firms would probably face consid-
erable tort liability, that they would need to keep insur-
ance costs down, and that they would need to keep claims
low, suggest that private firms would have ample motiva-
tion to stress safety. The safer and more cost efficient the
system, the cheaper it would be to the consumer. The
cheaper it is to the consumer, the greater the demand for
the product.
The insurance industry might regulate the system to
some degree. Air traffic control provider firms that do
not meet insurance company standards would probably
lose their insurance coverage. Firms that lose insurance
coverage would lose service contracts. Therefore, insur-
ance companies would be likely to require that controllers
work a minimal number of overtime hours, that they
maintain a proper level of fitness and training, that the
regulations and procedures they are subject to reflect a
realistic concern for safety, and that they remain ade-
quately equipped.
Likewise, airport operators would probably see to it
that private firms which provide them air traffic control
services meet insurance safety requirements.8 0 If their
air traffic control provider loses its insurance, the airport
would be required to either close down or operate with-
out a controller. Without a controller an airport would
probably lose consumer demand.18 ' Airport operators
would therefore make sure that peak hour traffic, for in-
stance, is held to a reasonable and safe level.
Privatization of the air traffic control system is only a
small part of the overall effort to privatize.182 At present,
proponents of privatization are looking for showcase ex-
'" See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
114 Id. "
See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of recent priva-
tization targets.
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amples of successful privatization.18 3 They want to edu-
cate the public to see the government as a facilitator and
regulator, and not as a provider. Proponents of privatiza-
tion want to decrease the influence of politics and bureau-
cracy. People in both political parties want to cut federal
expenditures and to increase federal bureaucratic
efficiency. 18 4
To date, privatization has been an idea with few oppo-
nents but, unfortunately, fewer backers. 185 Proponents of
privatization have been forming theory, building a propa-
ganda machine, and lobbying. They appear to anticipate
a long struggle, with their focus being on winning popular
support. 18 6 The public can expect a long-term war of
propaganda between those who favor individual govern-
ment programs and those who want privatization.
1.3 See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the privatiza-
tion goals of the Reagan administration.
,84 See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the political
difficulties regarding privatization.
185 Miller, supra note 1, at 19; see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
11,; Miller, supra note 1, at 19; S. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 58; see supra notes 51-
53 and accompanying text.
